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British workers are reported as having the highest levels of stress in Europe; indeed 1 in 5 workers
(around 5 million people) is affected by stress.1 The cost to Britain’s economy is broadly estimated
at approximately 6.7 million working days lost each year – valued at between £3.7–£3.8 billion.2
As recently as 14th October 2002 the TUC launched a campaign “Tackle the Hassle” designed to
focus on the 270,000 people per year who go sick, and the cost to British Companies of around
£538 per employee. 
Along with these startling statistics has come an increased understanding of the nature and extent
of occupational stress. The Health Education Authority in their report “Stress in the Public
Sector” (1988) helpfully defines stress as an “excess of demand upon an individual in excess of
their ability to cope”. Similarly, the Health and Safety Commission report, “Managing
occupational stress; a guide for managers and teachers in the schools sector” (1990), identified
stress as “…an unresolved mismatch between the perceived pressures of the work situation and an
individual’s ability to cope”. (The report concluded unremarkably, although interestingly in the
light of subsequent case law, that teaching could be a stressful profession…). 
More recently the Health and Safety Executive in their publication “Stress at Work” (1995)
adopted a more illuminating approach. Referring to stress as “…the reaction people have to
excessive pressures or other types of demands placed upon them”, they distinguish stress from
both pressure, and the psychiatric consequences of this. Pressure at work can in some cases cause
stress – i.e. an individual response to pressure. The HSE report continues 
“Stress is not therefore the same as ill health. But in some cases particularly where pressures are
intense and continue for some time, the effect of stress can be more sustained and far more
damaging, leading to longer term psychological problems…”.
As any student of this area of law will know, damages are only recoverable for a recognised
psychological condition; stress may be the midwife of such a condition3 but does not of itself
sound in damages. 
* Solicitor, Barratts solicitors, Nottingham.
1 Health & Safety Executive Press Release E206: 00 – 1st
November 2000
2 ibid
3 Hinz v Berry [1970] 2 QB 40; McLaughlin v O’Brian
[1983] 1AC 410; Alcock v Chief Constable of South
Yorkshire Police [1992] 1AC 310; 
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The TUC (Trade Union Congress) recognised the European Week for Health and Safety 2002 by
prescribing a TUC stress MOT for use by employees. They have indicated that workplace stress
claims have increased by a factor of 12 in the period 1999 to 2000.4 The Health and Safety
Executive have developed some criteria for the identification and reduction of workplace stress.
Reasonable employers should be aware of this research and should take into account in taking
measures pursuant to risk assessments.5 Further, the Working Time Directive 93/104/EC should in
the future assist workers injured through stress from long hours of work. Against this background
what right of action does an employee suffering from occupationally related stress have?
In order to fully understand the current legal situation and the position of employees considering
bringing an action for occupationally related stress, it is necessary to consider the two seminal
cases. The first reported decision was Walker v Northumberland County Council.6 Whilst this set a
marker for cases of this nature there was some uncertainty as to the scope of the decision and its
implication for future claims. Thereafter, in Hatton v Sutherland (and three other cases heard at the
same time)7 the Court of Appeal, in the first reported decision of that Court which dealt with this
issue, helpfully clarified the law post-Walker. As will be made clear below, although some
practitioners interpreted this decision as a change in the law, or a raising of the bar for potential
Claimants, in reality it was a consolidation of the common-law position as set out in Walker. 
Walker v Northumberland County Council
Whilst claims for occupational stress have long been recognised by other common law
jurisdictions, especially USA and Australia, it was not until Walker v Northumberland County
Council that a marker was first put down in this jurisdiction. The Claimant was an experienced
Area Social Services Officer with responsibility for the management of four teams of Social
Services field workers in an area with a large number of childcare problems. In the 1980s an
increase in population brought a significant increase in the number of cases referred to him. 
He repeatedly sought assistance from management in the form of extra staff or guidance on work
distribution; however neither was forthcoming. In November 1986 he suffered a mental
breakdown and under medical advice remained off work until March 1987. On his return to work
it was agreed that an assistant would be made available. However this agreement was not adhered
to. Consequently the Claimant was exposed to a rapidly increasing workload, and the
responsibility for dealing with a substantial backlog of paperwork. In September 1987, some six
months after returning to work, he suffered a second nervous breakdown. In February 1988 he was
dismissed by his employers on the grounds of ill health. 
He claimed damages against his former employer for breach of their duty of care as his employer,
in failing to take reasonable steps to avoid exposing him to a health endangering workload. 
He contended that his immediate superiors knew that social work was particularly stressful, that
such stress could give rise to mental illness, and his workload was such as to impose increasing
stress on him, and that his employers ought reasonably to have foreseen that unless they took steps
to alleviate the impact of that workload, there was a real risk of him becoming mentally ill. 
Colman J, hearing the case at first instance, found for the Claimant. In giving judgment he
4 TUC Briefing Document Issue 25th September 2002. 
5 See HSE Stress Research and Stress Management;
Putting Theory to Work, HSE Contract Research Report
No. 61/1993.
6 [1995] 1AER 737
7 [2002] EWCA Civ 76
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acknowledged that although the first breakdown was caused by his employers’ failure to provide
adequate resources, it was not reasonably foreseeable at that time that the workload to which he
was exposed gave rise to a material risk of mental illness. However so far as the second breakdown
was concerned, the Court found that it was foreseeable that if the Claimant was exposed to the
same or a similar workload, there was a risk of him once more becoming mentally ill. He
concluded :– 
“The standard of care to be expected of a reasonable local authority required that in March
1987, such additional assistance should be provided… and the workload on Mr Walker thereby
permanently reduced… notwithstanding that it could be expected to have some disruptive
effect on the Council’s provision of services to the public. It chose to continue to employ him
but provided no effective help. In so doing, it was in my judgement acting unreasonably and
therefore in breach of its duty of care”.
In reaching their decision, the Court in Walker felt it necessary to review the fundamentals of the
law on negligence – especially in so far as it related to psychiatric injury.
The elements of negligence
Although the precise scenario had not previously received judicial consideration, it is clear from
the judgment of Colman J that the approach to be adopted in determining negligence is not new.
It is the “ordinary principles of employers’ liability” which are to be applied (per Lord Steyn in
Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire8). These are of course proof of the existence of a duty of
care, breach of such duty, and damage suffered as a result. In order to succeed, the successful
Claimant will have to show foreseeability of what might happen if care is not taken. This
foreseeability requirement whether construed as a component of the existence of a duty, or of its
breach, has been most succinctly set out by Simon Brown LJ in Garrett v London Borough of
Camden.9 In considering the huge variety of causes of psychological illness he (Simon Brown LJ)
concludes:– 
“Many suffer breakdowns and depressive illnesses and a significant proportion could doubtless
ascribe some of their problems to the strains and stresses of their work situation. Unless
however there was a real risk of breakdown which the Claimant’s employers ought reasonably
to have foreseen and which they ought properly to have averted, there can be no liability”. 
It is readily recognised that because of the very nature of psychiatric disorder it is bound to be
harder to foresee than physical injury. The approach to reasonable foreseeability of the risk of
work engendered psychiatric injury is helpfully illustrated by the judgment of Miles CJ in Gillespie
v Commonwealth of Australia.10 That case involved a claim by a former Australian diplomat against
the Australian Foreign Affairs and Trade Department in respect of a mental breakdown which he
suffered in consequence of stresses created by the living conditions in Caracas, Venezuela where he
had been posted. The Claimant contended that such stress and therefore his injury would have
8 [1999] 2 AC 455
9 [2001] EWCA Civ 395
10 [1991] ACTR 1
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been avoided or reduced if the Defendants had before sending him to Caracas, prepared him (by a
course of training) for the severely stressful conditions likely to be encountered. Miles CJ observed
at page 15:– 
“In the present case it is not necessary to consider foreseeability with respect to the existence
of a duty of care, because the relationship of employer and employee itself gives rise to that
duty of care. Foreseeability for the present purposes is to be considered only in so far as the
degree of remoteness of the harm sustained by the Plaintiff set the parameters of the steps that
a reasonable person in the position of the Defendant would have taken to reduce the risk to the
extent that any “unnecessary” risk was eliminated. In practical terms this means that the
Plaintiff must show that the Defendant unreasonably failed to take such steps as would reduce
the risk to what was a reasonable, that is a socially acceptable, level. It may be that this takes the
Court into an area of value judgement for which the inscrutability of a jury verdict may
provide a more appropriate means of expression.” 
In Walker once the first breakdown had alerted the Defendants to the problem, it was much easier
for the Claimant to persuade the court that, at least from that point, it was foreseeable that
exposure to similar stresses would cause a similar psychological injury. As Colman J put it:– 
“…the question is whether it ought to have been foreseen that Mr Walker was exposed to a risk
of mental illness materially higher than that which would ordinarily affect a social services
middle manager in the position with a really heavy workload.”
The extent to which a reasonable employer should foresee a harmful reaction to workplace
pressures depends on the interplay between a number of relevant factors. These of course include
the nature and extent of the work being done by the employee, and any manifest signs from the
employee himself. So far as the nature and extent of the work being done by the employee is
concerned a court is more likely to consider an adverse psychological reaction to be foreseeable if
others have already suffered injury to their health arising from such work. (See in particular the
observation of Hale LJ in Sutherland v Hatton11 from para 23). Abnormal levels of sickness and
absence amongst others would be relevant evidence.
Probably more important are the signs from the employee himself. It is not sufficient for a
Claimant to show that it was reasonably foreseeable that the working environment would lead to
stress. He must go beyond this – and show that it was reasonably foreseeable that the working
environment would lead to damage to his health. This will clearly depend on the circumstances. In
Walker the court found that although the Claimant complained about his workload prior to his
first breakdown, this was not sufficient to render it foreseeable that he would develop a
psychological illness. Clearly medical evidence in the form of a GP’s sick notes or letters would
place the employer on notice. Similarly uncharacteristically prolonged absences from work would
place the employer on notice. However the employer must have good reason to think that the
underlying cause is occupational stress rather than other factors. 
Having established foreseeability, the successful Claimant will also have to show a breach of the
duty to take reasonable care. Once again, when assessing whether a breach has taken place, the
Court will consider in addition to the foreseeability of harm, the magnitude of the risk of that
11 See footnote 7 supra
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harm occurring, the gravity of the harm which may take place, the cost and practicability of
preventing it, and the justifications for running the risk.12 This duty was most succinctly
encapsulated by Swanwick J in Stokes v Guest Keane Nettleford (Nuts & Bolts) Ltd.13 Although
dealing with an action for damages for scrotal cancer caused by mineral soaked clothing, the dictum
applies equally to cases involving psychological injury. He maintained:–
“the overall test is still the conduct of a reasonable and prudent employer, taking positive
thought for the safety of his workers in the light of what he knows or ought to know; where
there is a recognised and general practice which has been followed for a substantial period in
similar circumstances without mishap, he is entitled to follow it, unless in the light of
commonsense or newer knowledge it is clearly bad; but where there is developing knowledge,
he must keep reasonably abreast of it and not be too slow to apply it; and where he has in fact
greater than average knowledge of the risks he may be therefore obliged to take more than the
average or standard precaution. He must weigh up the risk in terms of the likelihood of injury
occurring and the potential consequences if it does; and he must balance against this the
probable effectiveness of the precautions that can be taken to meet it and the expense and
inconvenience they involve. If he is found to have fallen below the standard to be properly
expected of a reasonable and prudent employer in these respects, he is negligent.” 
Although it may be tempting, having determined that harm was foreseeable and such harm had
taken place, to conclude that the employer was in breach of his duty, this is not the case. It is always
necessary to consider what the employer not only could but should have done. Moreover the
employer can only be reasonably expected to take steps which are likely to do some good. This yet
again involves notions of reasonableness and the Court will take into account the size and scope
of the employer’s operation – and the interests of other employees in the workplace.14
Lastly the Claimant will have to establish causation – in other words that the particular breach of
duty caused the harm. Whereas in many cases this may be straight forward, this will be a matter
of expert medical evidence. Any Claimant who brings such a claim must expect his past medical
history to be scrutinised in detail so as to determine the extent to which any psychological ill health
preceded his absence from work, or was linked to non-work related stressors. Whilst the
Defendant must take the Claimant as he finds him (the “egg shell skull rule”)15, a Defendant will
successfully defeat a claim for damages for psychological illness if he can show that the same would
have happened irrespective of the Defendant’s negligence.
There has been little judicial authority on the extent to which an employer owes to his employees
a duty not to cause them psychiatric damage by the volume or character of the work which the
employees are required to perform. Whereas it is clear law that an employer has a duty to provide
his employee with a reasonably safe system of work and to take reasonable steps to protect him
from risks which are reasonably foreseeable such law has developed almost exclusively in cases
12 See Dicta of Lord Reid in Overseas Tank Ship (UK)
Ltd v The Miller Steamship Company Ltd [1967] AC
617 at page 642. He said: “It does not follow that, no
matter what the circumstances may be, it is justifiable to
neglect a risk of such a small magnitude. A reasonable
man would only neglect such a risk if he had some valid
reason for doing so, eg that it would involve considerable
expense to eliminate the risk. He would weigh the risk
against the difficulty of eliminating it”.
13 [1968] 1WLR 1776
14 See British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] AC
877 per Lord Reid at page 899 and Watt v
Herefordshire County Council [1954] 1WLR 835 per
Denning LJ at page 838.
15 Lord Parker CJ in The Wagon Mound (No. 1) [1961]
1ACR 388 at page 414.
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involving physical injury to the employee as distinct from injury to his mental health. However as
Walker illustrates, there is no logical reason why risk of psychiatric damage should be excluded
from the scope of an employer’s duty of care or from the co-extensive implied term in a contract
of employment. That said there can be no doubt that the circumstances in which claims based on
such damage are likely to arise will often give rise to extremely difficult evidential problems of
foreseeability and causation. This is particularly so in the environment of the professions where
the Claimant may be ambitious and dedicated, determined to succeed in his career in which he
knows the work to be demanding, and may have a measure of discretion as to how and when and
for how long he works, but where the character or volume of the work given to him eventually
drives him to breaking point. Given that professional work is often demanding and stressful, at
what point is the employer’s duty to take protective steps engaged? What assumption is he entitled
to make about the employee’s resilience, mental toughness and stability of character given that
people of clinically normal personality may have a widely differing ability to absorb stress
attributable to their work? 
Whilst in Walker the Court broke new ground in finding for a Claimant who had suffered
psychiatric injury as a result of stress at work, the tools used by the Court to determine the issue
of negligence were those honed over the years in dealing with cases of physical injury. What is
clear however from Walker is that damages for psychiatric injury following stress at work are merely
a development, or an extension of the law of negligence. Whilst there will be new evidential
difficulties and problems of foreseeability and causation, there was no indication that a wholesale
review of the common-law of employers’ liability was to be considered. However the increase in
stress at work, combined with growing awareness of the possibilities of successful litigation have
led to an increasing willingness to litigate. Not surprisingly many of the cases involve public
servants, and in particular teachers. 
A number of these cases involving appeals against first instance decisions came before the Court
of Appeal in early 2002. They provided the Appellate Court with an opportunity to reconsider
both the case of Walker itself, and a review of the common-law of negligence as it pertained to
stress related psychiatric damage suffered in the workplace. 
Hatton v Sutherland & Others
In February 2002 the Court of Appeal (Brooke, Hale and Kaye LLJ) handed down Judgment in
Hatton v Sutherland, Barber v Somerset County Council, Jones v Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council,
and Bishop v Baker Refractories Ltd.16 These four separate appeals, heard together, provided the
Court with an opportunity to revisit the principles set out in Walker in an effort to clarify this
difficult area of law. In each case the appellants were the employer Defendants who failed at first
instance. The circumstances of each appeal are as follows.
Penelope Hatton was employed as a French teacher in a comprehensive school in Liverpool from
1980 until 1995. In January 1994 she was off work for a month following an attack in the street,
and later that year her son was admitted to hospital for a considerable time. She remained away for
the rest of the term with medical certificates identifying depression and debility. On her return to
work in September 1994 she attributed her absence to her son’s illness. Finally, in October 1995
she was signed off work with depression and debility and never returned.
16 [2002] EWCA Civ 76.
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His Honour Judge Trigger sitting in Liverpool County Court accepted that one of the major
precipitating factors contributing to the Claimant’s stress was the increase in her duties and
pressures at school. He found against the school on the basis that by September 1995 it was clear
that the Claimant was suffering from a stress-induced illness. The Court of Appeal however
accepted that although the Claimant had an increased workload, it was no greater than any other
teacher in a similar school. Moreover the Claimant had never complained about this, rather relying
on her son’s illness as the cause of her absence from work. The court accepted that it was not
reasonably foreseeable to the employer that the psychological harm experienced by the Claimant
was attributable to her school-work. (Interestingly, had the Claimant been able to satisfy the test of
foreseeability she would then have had to show that the school could have managed affairs in such
a way as to have made a difference). 
Leon Barber was an experienced head of maths at Bridgewater Community School in Somerset.
Because of declining rolls, his responsibilities as a maths teacher fell, and in order to keep his
former salary he took on additional publicity and marketing responsibilities resulting in an
increased workload. With no previous history of psychiatric illness he first developed depressive
symptoms in autumn 1995 but told no one at school about these. After periods of absence from
work he eventually in July 1996 revealed to his superiors the detrimental effect his work situation
was having on his health. Notwithstanding the deterioration of his condition he continued to work
but in November 1996 lost control of a classroom and was advised to stop work immediately. His
Honour Judge Roach sitting at Exeter County Court found for the Claimant, concluding that the
illness was caused by stress at work. On appeal however the court refused to accept that the
Defendant education authority was in breach of its duty of care to the Claimant. The three appeal
judges took the view that although the Claimant had mentioned just before the summer holidays
that he was suffering from ill health, he returned and made no such complaints. Had he approached
the Deputy Head at the beginning of the autumn term and explained that things had not improved,
the Court may have considered the matter differently. 
Olwyn Jones was employed as an administrative assistant at a local authority training centre from
August 1992. The evidence at first instance was that she was required to work grossly excessive
hours and expected to perform variously the work of 2 – 3 people. Notwithstanding repeated
complaints to her managers of excessive work, nothing was done. In mid 1994 she addressed her
problems in a detailed document submitted to her employers but nothing further happened. 
By the end of 1994, in the absence of any response she invoked the grievance procedure. However
before the hearing of her complaint took place she went off sick and never returned. At first
instance his Honour Judge Nicholl sitting at Birmingham County Court found for the Claimant.
The Court of Appeal upheld this decision albeit not “without hesitation”. They accepted that
damage to the employee’s health was foreseeable and that obvious steps could have been taken to
avoid the employer being in breach of duty to their employee. The Claimant’s case was
strengthened by the acknowledgement by senior management that there were steps which they
could have taken, but which they failed to do.
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The last of the four cases involved Melvyn Bishop a raw materials operative at a factory in West
Yorkshire. He worked for his employers from 1979 until 1994 without difficulty. However
following a re-organisation of workloads he found difficulties and complained unsuccessfully to
his manager. Finally he attended his GP who provided the Claimant with sick notes. Shortly after
he suffered a nervous breakdown. At first instance his Honour Judge Kent-Jones sitting at Leeds
County Court found for the Claimant. In his view the history should have prompted the
employers to investigate the situation immediately. Either he should have been given a job he could
do or his employment terminated. Accordingly the Defendant was liable for the Claimant’s
breakdown. Not surprisingly perhaps the Court of Appeal overturned this decision. They found
that the appellant had no notice that the Claimant was likely to suffer psychiatric illness if he
continued in his job – especially as Mr Bishop had concealed from his employer the advice that his
doctor had given to him to change jobs. It was he, Mr Bishop who chose to go back to work but
there was little evidence to satisfy a court that a breakdown was reasonably foreseeable. In short
there was nothing the employer could have done to enable Mr Bishop’s employment to continue
– especially against a background of the majority of employees welcoming the re-organised work
shifts.
Having considered the legal principles to be adopted in considering claims for occupational stress,
but before adjudicating on each case, the Court of Appeal took the opportunity of setting out a
number of principles to be adopted when considering such cases. The 16 “practical propositions”
which emerge from the Court’s analysis of existing case law are:–
(1) There are no special control mechanisms applying to claims for psychiatric (or physical) illness
or injury arising from the stress of doing the work the employee is required to do. The
ordinary principles of employer’s liability apply.
(2) The threshold question is whether this kind of harm suffered by this particular employee was
reasonably foreseeable; this has two components (a) an injury to health (as distinct from
occupational stress) which (b) is attributable to stress at work (as distinct from other factors).
(3) Foreseeability depends upon what the employer knows (or ought reasonably to know) about
the individual employee. Because of the nature of mental disorder, it is harder to foresee than
physical injury, but may be easier to foresee in a known individual than in the population at
large. An employer is usually entitled to assume that the employee can withstand the normal
pressures of the job unless he knows of some particular problem or vulnerability.
(4) The test is the same whatever the employment; there are no occupations which should be
regarded as intrinsically dangerous to mental health.
(5) Factors likely to be relevant in answering the threshold question include:–
(a) The nature and extent of the work done by the employee. Is the workload much more than is
normal for the particular job? Is the work particularly intellectually or emotionally
demanding for this employee? Are demands being made of this employee unreasonable when
compared with the demands made of others in the same or comparable jobs? Or are there
signs that other doing this job are suffering from harmful levels of stress? Is there an abnormal
level of sickness or absenteeism in the same job or the same department?
(b) Signs from the employee of impending harm to health. Has he a particular problem or
vulnerability? Has he already suffered from illness attributable to stress at work? Have there
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recently been frequent or prolonged absences which are uncharacteristic of him? Is there
reason to think that these are attributable to stress at work, for example because of
complaints or warnings from him or others?
(6) The employer is generally entitled to take what he is told by his employee at face value, unless
he has good reason to think to the contrary. He does not generally have to make searching
enquiries of the employee or seek permission to make further enquiries of his medical advisers.
(7) To trigger a duty to take steps, the indications of impending harm to health arising from stress
at work must be plain enough for any reasonable employer to realise that he should do
something about it.
(8) The employer is only in breach of duty if he has failed to take the steps which are reasonable
in the circumstances, bearing in mind the magnitude of the risk of harm occurring, the gravity
of the harm which may occur, the costs and practicability of preventing it, and the
justifications for running the risk.
(9) The size and scope of the employer’s operations, its resources and the demands it faces are
relevant in deciding what is reasonable; these include the interests of other employees and the
need to treat them fairly, for example, in any redistribution of duties.
(10) An employer can only reasonably be expected to take steps which are likely to do some good;
the court is likely to need expert evidence on this.
(11) An employer who offers a confidential advice service, with referral to appropriate counselling
or treatment services, is unlikely to be found in breach of duty.
(12) If the only reasonable and effective step would have been to dismiss or demote the employee,
the employer will not be in breach of duty in allowing a willing employee to continue in the job.
(13) In all cases, therefore, it is necessary to identify the steps which the employer both could and
should have taken before finding him in breach of his duty of care.
(14) The Claimant must show that the breach of duty has caused or materially contributed to the
harm suffered. It is not enough to show that occupational stress has caused the harm.
(15) Where the harm suffered has more than one cause, the employer should only pay for that
proportion of the harm suffered which is attributable to his wrongdoing, unless the harm is
truly indivisible. It is for the Defendant to raise the question of apportionment.
(16) The assessment of damages will take account of any pre-existing disorder or vulnerability and
of the chance that the Claimant would have succumbed to a stress related disorder in any event.
Whilst a welcome clarification of the law, many practitioners17 have taken the view that the
judgment is unlikely to have a significant impact upon the number of occupational stress claims
reaching the civil courts in future. Whilst the publicity surrounding these cases has dwelt on the
failure of (three of) these appeals it would be wrong to suggest that Hatton had changed the law. The
Court of Appeal has done a valuable job in clarifying the principles to be adopted when assessing
such a case. However these principles are merely developments of the existing common law and
include no radical departure. Whilst some Claimants (and their lawyers) may be deterred from
bringing claims, the duty of care of an employer has not been altered. Clearly from this judgment
17 Judging from the many discussions the writer has had with other specialist personal injury lawyers.
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a duty is placed on the employee to convey stress and the consequences of such stress to his
employer. Similarly an employer is entitled to take what is told to him by his employee, at face
value without an inquisition. However the Court of Appeal has very firmly closed the door on the
argument that certain forms of employment are so stressful that they could endanger the mental
health of those involved in those particular forms of employment (an argument that has been put
forward by such groups as teachers, social workers and prison officers). It is clear from the
judgment that where an employee is suffering from work-related stress he or she must inform his
employer. Of the three unsuccessful respondents to the appeals, Mrs Hatton and Mr Barber failed
to inform their employers that they were being put under pressure as a consequence of their work.
The employers argued that they were therefore not given notice that problems were arising as a
consequence of work and were not in breach of duty for having failed to take any steps to deal
with this. This of course is precisely the position in Walker and why Mr Walker failed in respect
of his first breakdown. If there is no history of psychiatric illness arising as a direct consequence
of the employment, an employee is now less likely to succeed. 
The Court of Appeal has in effect, upheld the decision of Colman J in Walker but in doing so has
indicated in very clear terms that there is to be no dilution of the Walker test. Whilst the 16
propositions may well serve to reduce the number of claims that can be successfully pursued,
Hatton has certainly not sounded the death knell for individuals suffering from psychological
injury as a result of work-related stress. 
